PH6A-FPSO-FINAL-INTEGRATION-PROMPT-B-REV2

IADA-REV1, FUNCTIONAL-BASELINE-REV1 and IAD (REV2 designation not issued; current frozen interaction design remains IAD REV1 as retested) are design baselines. No production implementation exists to compare, so ArchitectureDrift, FunctionalContractDrift, StateMachineDrift, AuthorityModelDrift, SourceAuthorityDrift, EvidenceModelDrift and AIControlDrift are each NOT_MEASURABLE — not zero.

IdentitySource, RoleSource, DecisionRightSource, DelegationModel, RevocationModel, PrivilegedAccess, EmergencyAccess, ServiceIdentity, MachineIdentity and SessionControl remain CANDIDATE_ONLY. OER-01 (IAM / DecisionRight owner decision) is OPEN — ISSUED_AWAITING_OWNER. AuthenticatedIdentity ≠ DecisionRight is preserved as an invariant, not as an implemented control.

No owner has confirmed AuthoritativeSource / SemanticAuthority / WriteAuthority for any material object. The 12-attribute source register exists as a design artefact only. No universal platform authority is asserted.

Zero production interfaces exist. Declaring Interface_ID/Authentication/Idempotency status would constitute fake integration status, explicitly prohibited by §5.

ApplicationVersion, RuleVersion, ConfigurationVersion, RequirementCatalogueVersion, RecordCatalogueVersion, DecisionRightsVersion, SourceAuthorityRegisterVersion, Integration/Environment/Security/Deployment configuration, DataModelVersion and AuditConfiguration cannot be baselined against an unvalidated operational state.

The 18 threat classes (credential compromise, privilege escalation, broken authorization, session attack, API abuse, injection, XSS, CSRF, malicious files, data manipulation, rule tampering, configuration tampering, integration spoofing, replay, DoS, offline tampering, reconciliation attack, supply-chain compromise) require a deployed production system with real IAM and integrations. Executing them against a prototype would produce non-attributable assurance.

NO_CYBERSECURITY_COMPROMISE_MAY_SILENTLY_PROMOTE_OPERATIONAL_AUTHORITY_OR_READINESS is carried forward as a binding invariant. Integrity uncertainty ⇒ HOLD / REASSESS. This is the only §7–§9 item that can be truthfully stated at this evidence level.

No security assessment executed; PASS / PASS_WITH_CONTROLLED_ACTIONS / HOLD / FAIL cannot be selected without evidence.

TechnologyFailure ≠ ControlBypass and the RESTORE → COMPARE → RECONCILE → CONFLICT_CHECK → AUTHORITY_CHECK → VERSION_CHECK → INTEGRITY_CHECK → VERIFIED chain are specified in the frozen functional baseline; no production recovery has been exercised.

The 14-element reconstruction set (Who, What, When, Where, Source, Version, Requirement, Authority, DecisionRight, Evidence, Transition, Failure, Override, Recovery) is modelled in the append-only ledger; reconstruction requires no AI narrative. Production audit configuration is absent.

Accountable owners for Application, Technical Support, Configuration, Cybersecurity, Data, DecisionRights, Sources, Evidence, Release, Incidents, Changes and Business Continuity are VACANT_PENDING_OWNER_CONFIRMATION. No role is assumed (§12).

No production implementation exists to verify against architecture, contracts, authority, sources, rules, transitions, cybersecurity, offline, integrations, evidence, audit or measurement.

No BEFORE baseline exists (BC-09 prospective BEFORE NOT_STARTED, time-irreversible). ObservedDifference ≠ AttributableBenefit is preserved; TimeReduction → TimeSaved → TimeReleased → ProductiveTimeCaptured → FinancialValue cannot begin. CONTROL_VALUE_TIME remains protected — no efficiency claim may consume control time.

No risk may be recorded as ResidualRisk = NONE. Control effectiveness for every entry remains UNPROVEN because no operational evidence has been admitted.

Creation requires acceptable G-FPSO-09, G-FPSO-SEC-01, G-FPSO-10 and an established OperationalConfigurationBaseline — all four unmet. PH6A-IADA-REV1-SEAL-01 remains the only active seal and is untouched.

No controlled production export exists. No hash is invented, quoted or reused.

The chain Requirement → ControlObjective → Capability → FunctionalContract → Rule → Source → DecisionRight → Evidence → Gate → ResidualRisk → ValueMechanism is intact up to Rule; it breaks at Source (unconfirmed authority), DecisionRight (OER-01 open), Evidence (0 admitted), Gate (G-PH6A HOLD) and ValueMechanism (no BEFORE baseline).

9 of 10 closeout requirements unmet; only the security invariant assertion is carried.

BaselineIntegrity is confirmed at design level, but EvidenceAccuracy, ProductionStatus, ResidualRiskDisclosure, OpenActions, FinancialClaims, IP/Confidentiality, OwnershipRepresentation, AIRepresentation, DemoRepresentationReadiness and PublicationScope cannot be dispositioned without §13/§16 outcomes.

Authorization is evaluated per class; no class may represent production or pilot outcomes.

0 of 8 authorization conditions satisfied.

An immutable package would require DemoBaseline_ID, OperationalConfigurationBaseline, Seal_ID (SEAL-02), PilotEvidenceReferences and SecurityBaselineReference — none of which exist. No scenario-specific code is or would be introduced.

The ChangeEvent → ImpactAssessment → ScopedRevalidation → GateRecheck → ConfigurationUpdate → SEAL-03 chain is defined, but CONTINUOUS_ASSURANCE cannot be declared ACTIVE without an established configuration baseline and an appointed assurance owner.

Obtain authentic OER-03 owner decision authorizing a FUTURE prospective BEFORE start timestamp (BC-09, time-irreversible).

Obtain OER-01 IAM / DecisionRight owner decision establishing real IdentitySource, RoleSource and DecisionRightSource.

Obtain OER-02 BC-06 Critical Control decision — Path A (real critical control) or Path B (formal rescope with recorded DecisionAuthority, Reason, PilotEvidenceLost, ResidualRisk, Phase7Impact).

Obtain OER-04 EXT-15 offline signature reconciliation decision.

Confirm authoritative source, semantic authority and write authority per material object (§4) with named owners and stewards.

Appoint the 12 service-management accountable owners and the ContinuousAssuranceOwner (§12, §24).