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Independent Integrated Software Architecture & Design Assurance Review

HOLDMACRO-PROMPT A NOT AUTHORIZED
Review ID
PH6A-II-SADR-REV0
Review type
INDEPENDENT_INTEGRATED_SOFTWARE_ASSURANCE
Objective
FIND DEFECTS — NOT CONFIRM PRIOR RESULTS
Evidence class
INDEPENDENT_DESIGN_ASSURANCE_EVIDENCE

Prior acceptance is evidence to review, not proof of correctness.

A. Independent assurance executive decision

Defect discovery over prior-result confirmation

The baseline chain is architecturally coherent and, in the majority of inspected domains, structurally sound: authority is separated from authentication, source authority is object-specific, unknown never degrades to not-required, and cumulative SIMOPS cannot be satisfied by pairwise pass. The review nevertheless falsifies the claim that the design is implementation-safe. One CRITICAL and four HIGH defects were reconstructed independently, of which two HIGH remain uncontrolled and one requires a targeted functional-baseline change. Macro-Prompt A is therefore not authorized.

FalsificationThree prior declarations did not survive independent reconstruction: the orphan-UI-action count, the external-dependency denominator treated as fully enumerated, and the claim that ImplementationMaterialAmbiguity = 0 across FC-FPSO-01…08.

Design-level analysis only. No prototype, no scenario execution, no live integration, no operational evidence. Parent architecture PH6A-IADA-REV1 remains sealed and unmodified.

OperationalClosureEvidence
NOT YET ACQUIRED
Phase6A
HOLD
Phase6B
NOT AUTHORIZED
Phase7
NO GO
BC09Protection
ACTIVE
PilotExposure
PROHIBITED
Review shall not
BUILD PROTOTYPEDESIGN NEW UICREATE NEW FEATURESCREATE DEMO SCENARIORUN OPERATIONAL DEMOCREATE OPERATIONAL EVIDENCEMODIFY PARENT BASELINE SILENTLYCREATE NEW CONTRACT SILENTLYCLOSE EXTERNAL DEPENDENCIES BY ASSUMPTION

B. Baseline integrity reconstruction

Prior declarations independently re-derived

BaselineDeclaredIndependent reconstructionVerdict
PH6A-IADA-REV1FROZEN_AND_SEALED (SEAL-01)Seal identifiers, four logical locks and provenance lineage PRV-01…PRV-18 re-derived; no downstream module mutates sealed semantics.
CONFIRMED
PH6A-BXIA-REV0ACCEPTED12 modules and 13-tab detail models re-counted and consistent; corporate vocabulary gap F-IAD-03 persists unresolved into the field layer.
CONFIRMED WITH NOTEF-SADR-09
PH6A-FPSO-AIA-REV0ACCEPTED / PROCEED_WITH_CONTROLLED_FUNCTIONAL_EXTENSION26 capability classifications re-derived; 8 New Functional Contract candidates map 1:1 onto FC-FPSO-01…08. Arithmetic holds.
CONFIRMED
PH6A-FPSO-FCD-REV0COMPLETE (38-element schema × 8)Schema completeness is structural, not semantic: every element is populated, but three elements (concurrency, version behaviour, failure behaviour) are populated at a level two independent teams could not converge on.
CONTRADICTIONF-SADR-02
PH6A-FPSO-FCA-REV0G-FPSO-03 = PASS_WITH_CONTROLLED_EXTERNAL_DEPENDENCIES10 of 11 findings closed by controlled correction as declared. External-dependency denominator declared as 12 distinct owner decisions; reconstruction identifies 14 — two dependencies (trusted-timestamp authority, IAM session-revocation propagation) are implied but never enumerated as owner decisions.
CONTRADICTIONF-SADR-04
PH6A-FPSO-FUNCTIONAL-BASELINE-REV0FROZEN — requirements of recordFreeze is intact and no retroactive edit detected. One clause (signature-to-decision binding) is internally under-specified rather than mutated.
CONFIRMED WITH NOTEF-SADR-01
PH6A-FPSO-IAD-REV1G-FPSO-04 = PASS · OrphanUIActions = 0Independent UX→contract recalculation yields 2 actions with no governing transition (bulk acknowledge on the register, and re-open of a closed pre-start record), not 0.
CONTRADICTIONF-SADR-03
Prior assurance result contradictions
IDPrior declarationReconstructedConsequenceFinding
PARC-01PH6A-FPSO-IAD-REV1: OrphanUIActions = 0OrphanUIActions = 2UX→contract traceability break; two material affordances have no transition, authority or event.F-SADR-03
PARC-02PH6A-FPSO-FCA-REV0: external-dependency denominator = 12 owner decisions14 owner decisionsTwo external dependencies are carried implicitly and would be closed by assumption at implementation.F-SADR-04
PARC-03PH6A-FPSO-FCD-REV0: ImplementationMaterialAmbiguity = 0ImplementationMaterialAmbiguity = 3 (FC-02, FC-05, FC-08)Two competent teams would produce materially different behaviour on retrieval election, delta materiality and signature invalidation.F-SADR-02

C. Architecture coherence assessment

CheckObjects inspectedResultDetail
DuplicateDomainObjectLocation, WorkPackage, JobCard
CLEAN
JobCard remains the execution unit; WorkPackage the planning aggregate; no shadow copy of Location identity in the field layer.
HiddenDuplicateResponsibilityPreStartPreventivePackage vs IPERCContinuo
FINDINGF-SADR-05
Both objects carry a notion of 'control still required'. Package completeness and IPERC control adequacy overlap semantically without a stated precedence rule.
CircularDependencyFieldDelta ↔ IPERC ↔ Package
FINDINGF-SADR-06
FieldDelta invalidates IPERC; IPERC delta raises FieldDelta. Termination is asserted but no cycle-breaking rule (delta generation number) is specified.
BidirectionalAuthorityDependencyDecisionRight ↔ DigitalSignatureAssurance
CLEAN
Signature consumes DecisionRight; DecisionRight never derived from a signature. Direction is enforced structurally.
UnclearOwnershipToolReadiness
FINDINGF-SADR-07
Business meaning, source data and configuration owners are not distinguishable for tool inspection validity.
SemanticOverlapApplicability vs ContextualDocumentRetrieval
CLEAN
Retrieval yields candidates; applicability is a separate governed evaluation. Separation holds in both contracts.
ArchitectureDriftFull chain vs PH6A-IADA-REV1
CLEAN
No change to object authority, mastership, offline authorization, no-compensation, Location governance, SIMOPS semantics or source/write boundaries.
LayerViolation / CrossLayerStateMutationIAD screen specs
CLEAN
No screen mutates state outside a declared transition.
PresentationLayerBusinessLogicRegister + Pre-Start Board
FINDINGF-SADR-08
Aggregate SIMOPS verdict presentation collapses to a single chip; the collapse rule is defined only in the interaction layer.
ImplementationSpecificSemanticsInContractFC-FPSO-01 (GPS)
CLEAN
Positioning technology is referenced as a confidence input, not as a contract obligation.
ContractSemanticsInUXOnlyIAD reason codes
CLEAN
All 55 reason codes originate in FCD, none introduced by IAD.

D. Capability governance assessment

No names or organizational assignments invented

CapabilityBusiness meaningSource dataRuleConfigurationExecutionVerdict
Location acquisition & canonical mappingReadiness layerPositioning + canonical Location registerReadiness layerPENDING_OWNER_VALIDATIONField humanGOVERNED
Contextual document retrievalDocument control functionAconex (candidate source)Readiness layerPENDING_OWNER_VALIDATIONSystem, human-reviewedGOVERNED
Applicability evaluationES&H / discipline authorityApplicability configurationReadiness layer rule engine (versioned)PENDING_OWNER_VALIDATIONSystem proposes / human confirmsGOVERNED
Pre-start preventive packageReadiness layerFederatedNo-compensation compositionPENDING_OWNER_VALIDATIONSupervisor preparesGOVERNED
Crew decision factsPeople / competency authorityTraining / Health / HR (decision facts only)Source-owned validityPENDING_OWNER_VALIDATIONSupervisor confirms crewGOVERNED
Tool inspection validityUNDISTINGUISHEDUNDISTINGUISHEDUNDISTINGUISHEDUNDISTINGUISHEDField human declaresCAPABILITY GOVERNANCE GAP
IPERC Continuo control adequacyES&H authorityPrepopulated + field observedReadiness layerPENDING_OWNER_VALIDATIONCrew + supervisorGOVERNED
Trusted timestamp for signatureUNDISTINGUISHEDUNDISTINGUISHEDUNDISTINGUISHEDUNDISTINGUISHEDSignature serviceCAPABILITY GOVERNANCE GAP

E. Functional contract implementability

ImplementationMaterialAmbiguity = 3 (required 0)

ContractNameTwo teams converge?Defects
FC-FPSO-01LocationAcquisitionServiceYES
FC-FPSO-02ContextualDocumentRetrievalNO
  • · ImplementationAmbiguity — behaviour on two plausible active revisions is 'do not auto-elect' but the resulting object state is unnamed
  • · UndefinedVersionBehaviour — retrieval timestamp vs revision effective date precedence unspecified
FC-FPSO-03PreStartPreventivePackageYES
FC-FPSO-04CrewConfirmationRecordYES
FC-FPSO-05IPERCContinuoNO
  • · MissingRule — materiality threshold of a field delta is left to human judgement with no recorded classification predicate
  • · UndefinedConcurrency — row-level concurrent edit resolution stated as 'conflict' without base-version granularity (row vs document)
FC-FPSO-06FieldDeltaAssessmentYES
FC-FPSO-07ToolReadinessYES
  • · Governance owner undefined (D-domain), but behaviour is unambiguous
FC-FPSO-08DigitalSignatureAssuranceNO
  • · MissingPostcondition — state of a signature whose object is invalidated after signing is not named
  • · UndefinedFailureBehaviour — timestamp authority unavailable: proceed-with-degraded-timestamp vs refuse is unspecified

F. Cross-contract dependency graph

10 edges · 1 cycle · 1 unversioned · 1 without owner · 0 bypassing authority

FromToVersionedFailure behaviourOwnerDefect
LocationAcquisition (FC-01)LocationContext (parent)YESFail-closed to human confirmationReadiness layer
LocationContextContextualDocumentRetrieval (FC-02)YESSOURCE_UNAVAILABLE → no package readinessDocument control
ContextualDocumentRetrieval (FC-02)Applicability (parent)NODefinedReadiness layerUnversionedDependency — applicability consumes retrieved set without binding the retrieval snapshot id
ApplicabilityPreStartPreventivePackage (FC-03)YESUNKNOWN → REQUIRES_HUMAN_CONFIRMATIONES&H
CrewConfirmation (FC-04)Package (FC-03)YESInvalid competency → package incompletePeople authority
IPERC (FC-05)Package (FC-03)YESOpen material delta → not authorizableES&H
FieldDelta (FC-06)IPERC (FC-05)YESReassessES&HCycle with FC-05 → FC-06; no generation/termination rule
FieldDelta (FC-06)Package (FC-03)YESDependency-scoped invalidationReadiness layer
ToolReadiness (FC-07)Readiness (parent)YESExpired inspection → not readyUNDEFINEDDependencyWithoutOwner
DigitalSignature (FC-08)Decision / State (parent)YESSignature failure → no state changeAuthority functionPost-signature invalidation outcome unnamed

G. State model sanity assessment

MachineDefect classDetailSeverity
PreStartPreventivePackageNone60 states / 33 transitions reconstructed; every state has an entry condition, an exit and an authority.NONE
ContextualDocumentRetrievalStateWithNoEntryConditionAmbiguous-revision outcome has no named state; retrieval remains in RETRIEVED while being non-consumable — a decorative status distinction only.HIGH
DigitalSignatureAssuranceTerminalStateThatShouldNotBeTerminalSIGNED is terminal; an object invalidated after signing has no governed successor state (e.g. SIGNED_SUPERSEDED).HIGH
IPERCContinuoTransitionWithoutReasonCodeRow-level revert of a human modification back to the source value emits no reason code.MEDIUM
FieldDeltaAssessmentUncontrolledCycleDelta → reassess → delta cycle lacks a generation counter.MEDIUM
CrewConfirmationRecordNoneNo dead, unreachable or duplicate states detected.NONE
ToolReadinessNoneExpiry is a computed attribute, correctly not modelled as a state.NONE
LocationAcquisitionNoneGPS confidence is an attribute; confirmation is a state entered only by human or governed fallback.NONE
· State — governed lifecycle position with entry condition, exit and authority
· StatusLabel — presentation of a state, never a state itself
· Attribute — computed or sourced property (e.g. inspection expiry, GPS confidence)
· ReasonCode — the governed justification of a transition
· Event — the emitted, immutable record that a transition occurred

H. Illegal-state reachability

9/10 blocked · ReachableIllegalMaterialStates = 1

Target illegal stateAttempt pathBlocked byReachable
AuthorizedWithoutDecisionRightAuthenticated supervisor with role but expired delegationDecisionRight resolved independently of role; UNRESOLVED → fail-closed
BLOCKED
AuthorizedWithMandatoryPackageItemIncompleteComplete-then-authorize with one mandatory item UNKNOWNNo-compensation predicate; UNKNOWN ≠ NOT_REQUIRED
BLOCKED
IPERCAuthorizedWithMaterialDeltaOpenDelta raised after review, before authorizationPackage invalidation on material delta
BLOCKED
SignedCurrentStateAgainstOldObjectVersionObject revised between signature request and submissionBase-version binding in FC-08
BLOCKED
CrewAcceptedWithInvalidMandatoryCompetencyStale competency decision fact accepted at confirmationValidity timestamp check
BLOCKED
ToolReadyWithExpiredRequiredInspectionInspection expires mid-shift after readiness computedNothing — readiness is not recomputed on time passage; expiry is evaluated at declaration only
REACHABLEF-SADR-10
DocumentApplicableWithoutApplicabilityEvaluationRetrieved document presented as applicableRetrieved ≠ Applicable separation
BLOCKED
LocationConfirmedByGPSWithoutHumanOrGovernedFallbackHigh-confidence auto-confirmGPS ≠ Authority invariant
BLOCKED
PairwiseSIMOPSPassWithAggregateConflictHiddenThree activities, all pairs PASSCUM-1…CUM-7 evaluated independently; pairwiseImpliesLocationPass = false
BLOCKED
AuthorizationInheritedAfterLocationChangeLocation change on an authorized packageLocation change invalidates authorization scope
BLOCKED

I–AL. Domain assessments

Each assessment independently reconstructed

I

Authority / privilege escalation

PASS

Eleven escalation vectors attempted (authentication, role, system permission, competency, document review, evidence acceptance, signature, supervisor presence, UI availability, AI recommendation, previous authorization). None produces DecisionRight. Delegation, expired role, shift change, Location change, risk change, activity change, stale cached permission and offline all fail closed to AuthorityResolutionState = UNRESOLVED.

J

Segregation of duties

PASS WITH FINDINGF-SADR-11

Preparation, review and authorization are separated for the package. For the IPERC Continuo, a single supervisor may author a field-observed row, confirm it and then review it where no independent cross-review is triggered; architecture requires materially independent authority for control adequacy.

K

Source authority

PASS

Aconex, Q4/Engica, Forwood, IAM, HR, Training, Health and Project Controls are all carried as CandidateSource or FederatedSource pending owner validation. No object claims SystemOfRecord without owner evidence. IntegratedSystem ≠ AuthoritativeSystem is preserved. SourceAuthorityPromotions = 0.

L

Document governance

PASS WITH FINDINGF-SADR-02

Automatic revision election is prohibited (closed by F-FCA-02). Supersession, effective date and retrieval timestamp are modelled. Multiple-active-revision ambiguity has correct prohibition but no named state, and document removal after package preparation is dependency-scoped but its reason code is generic.

M

Applicability engine

PASS

Retrieved / PotentiallyApplicable / Applicable / NotApplicable / RequiresHumanConfirmation are distinct. No path was found where MissingRule, MissingConfiguration or MissingMetadata degrades to NOT_APPLICABLE; all three route to REQUIRES_HUMAN_CONFIRMATION. UNKNOWN ≠ NOT_REQUIRED holds.

N

Preventive package

PASS

PACKAGE_EXISTS ≠ COMPLETE ≠ AUTHORIZED is structurally enforced. Invalidation on document revision, crew replacement, tool failure, SIMOPS change, IPERC delta, PETAR change and critical-control change is dependency-scoped; no global invalidation and no under-invalidation detected for the seven triggers.

O

IPERC Continuo

PASS WITH FINDINGF-SADR-02F-SADR-11

SYSTEM_PREPOPULATED / FIELD_OBSERVED / HUMAN_CONFIRMED / REVIEWED / AUTHORIZED are separated and source values remain reconstructable after human modification. Concurrent row edits and revert-to-source reason coding are under-specified.

P

Crew decision facts

PASS

FitnessDecisionFact, CompetencyDecisionFact and TrainingDecisionFact carry validity timestamps; underlying medical, training-history and HR detail is not stored in the field layer. Stale decision facts are visibly time-stamped and cannot be silently accepted.

Q

Tools / equipment

PASS WITH FINDINGF-SADR-07F-SADR-10

Tool (portable, person-attached) and Equipment (installed, Location-attached) are distinguished. Substitution, relocation and operator change propagate correctly. Inspection expiry during an active shift is not re-evaluated, and no governance owner is distinguishable.

R

SIMOPS

PASSF-SADR-08

Pairwise and LocationConcurrentWorkSet evaluation are independent. Three-activity cases where all pairs pass and CUM-3 / CUM-4 / CUM-6 fail were reconstructed and correctly produce a non-compensable STOP. PAIRWISE_PASS ≠ AGGREGATE_PASS holds in logic; the interaction layer must not collapse the two verdicts into one chip.

S

Delta propagation

PASS

Nine change classes were traced against the dependency graph. No under-invalidation and no over-invalidation detected; propagation is dependency-scoped in every case.

T

Digital signature

FAILF-SADR-01

SignerIdentity, DecisionRight, ObjectVersion, ContentIntegrity and CredentialStatus are all bound. VALID_SIGNATURE ≠ VALID_DECISION is stated. However the post-signature invalidation outcome is unnamed and the timestamp-authority-unavailable behaviour is undefined — the two conditions most likely to occur in field use.

U

Legal claim boundary

PASS

No artefact or interaction wording asserts LegalValidityConfirmed, DigitalNotary, NonRepudiationGuaranteed, LegallyBinding, PKIValidated or TrustedTimestampValidated. Signature is consistently described as an assurance control, not a legal instrument. UnsupportedLegalClaims = 0.

V

Concurrency

PASS WITH FINDINGF-SADR-02

Six of seven race conditions are governed by base-version comparison, conflict detection and audit events with no last-write-wins. IPERC row-level concurrent edit lacks a stated base-version granularity, leaving one uncontrolled path.

W

Idempotency

PASS

Eight replays executed at design level (location confirmation, retrieval, package generation, crew confirmation, IPERC submit, approval request, signature request, event emission). Correlation identity prevents duplicate objects, duplicate authority acts, duplicate signatures and double transitions. IdempotencyUncontrolledPaths = 0.

X

Offline / degraded

PASS

ONLINE / OFFLINE / SYNC_PENDING / CONFLICT / SOURCE_UNAVAILABLE each carry an allowed-action set. Material authorization is prohibited offline; captured evidence is marked PENDING_VERIFICATION. No OFFLINE_BYPASS_OF_CONTROL path found.

Y

Failure containment

PASS

GPS, Aconex, IAM, signature, critical-control source, storage and synchronization failures are each dependency-scoped. FailurePropagation = DEPENDENCY_SCOPED confirmed for all seven.

Z

Determinism

PASS WITH FINDINGF-SADR-10

Same facts, rule versions, configuration and decision rights produce the same material decision in every reconstructed case except tool inspection expiry, where wall-clock evaluation time changes the outcome without a recorded fact change.

AA

AI containment

PASS

AI output cannot confirm Location, determine final applicability, establish competency, approve IPERC or PETAR, grant DecisionRight, sign or authorize work — each attempt fails at the AI-to-Rule firewall. AI_OFF_MATERIAL_STATE_EQUIVALENCE confirmed: disabling AI changes no material state, only proposal availability.

AB

Provenance

PASS WITH FINDINGF-SADR-12

Decision ← RuleVersion ← Facts ← SourceRecords ← SourceSystems ← Owners ← HumanActions ← Timestamps is reconstructable for all material objects. One break: the applicability evaluation does not bind the retrieval snapshot id, so the exact document set behind an applicability decision is inferable but not pinned.

AC

Event model

PASS

26 emitted events inspected. Each carries actor, role, authority basis, previous and new state, reason code, object version and correlation id. Event ≠ State is preserved; no event is used as a state substitute.

AD

Security architecture

PASS WITH FINDINGF-SADR-04

Authentication and authorization boundaries are separate, least privilege is stated, audit records are append-only, and signature credentials are never held by the field layer. IAM session-revocation propagation latency is an unenumerated external dependency.

AE

Privacy / data minimisation

PASS

No health, HR or training detail is exposed to the field layer; decision facts are sufficient in every inspected case. Personal identifiers are limited to the person reference and displayed name required for crew confirmation.

AF

UX → contract

FAILF-SADR-03F-SADR-08

Independent recalculation: OrphanUIActions = 2 (register bulk acknowledge, re-open of closed pre-start record). UnreachableHumanTransitions = 0. NewFunctionalStatesThroughUI = 0. HiddenAuthorityActions = 0. StatePresentationContradictions = 1 (aggregate SIMOPS collapse).

AG

Contract → UX

PASS WITH FINDINGF-SADR-13

Every contractually required human transition is discoverable, reachable, permissioned and reason-coded. One transition — governed fallback for ambiguous canonical Location mapping — is technically reachable but buried three levels deep, i.e. OperationallyUnusableButTechnicallyReachable under field conditions.

AH

Bechtelization readiness

PASS WITH FINDINGF-SADR-09

Corporate vocabulary, document identity, register behaviour, workflow/owner/authority/source visibility, history and provenance are enterprise-grade; no consumer-app drift and no proprietary pixel copy. F-IAD-03 (vocabulary gap) was reassessed and is upgraded from NON_BLOCKING to BLOCKING for G-FPSO-04B: the field layer uses three terms for the same document object.

AI

Configuration management

PASS

Lineage IADA → AIA → FCD → FCA → FUNCTIONAL-BASELINE → IAD is intact. ParentBaseline references, change classes, finding closure and correction traceability are present. NoSilentMutation and NoRetroactiveBaselineEdit confirmed.

AJ

Evidence taxonomy

PASS

Architecture, design assurance, interaction design, implementation, software verification, simulation, operational closure, pilot and production evidence remain strictly separated. EVIDENCE_CLASS_PROMOTION = 0. OperationalClosureEvidence remains NOT_YET_ACQUIRED.

AK

Overclaim audit

PASS

No claim of live Aconex integration, validated APIs, configured corporate IAM, confirmed Forwood or Engica authority, signature legal sufficiency, completed owner validation, completed pilot or production readiness. All are consistently carried as pending owner decisions. OverclaimFindings = 0.

AL

Testability

PASS WITH FINDINGF-SADR-02

Acceptance predicates are observable, repeatable, version-aware and source-aware. One is untestable as written: IPERC delta materiality depends on unrecorded human judgement, so the same input cannot be shown to yield the same classification.

AM. Adversarial scenario results ADV-01…ADV-20

14 pass · 2 controlled · 4 fail — adversarial design assurance evidence only

IDInitial state / triggerContractsExpected governed behaviourObserved design behaviourInvariantDisposition
ADV-01
IPERC REVIEWED, signature request open
Location changes
FC-01, FC-05, FC-08Signature request invalidated; authorization scope voidedLocation change invalidates authorization scope and voids the open requestHELDPASS
ADV-02
Package REVIEWED
Crew member replaced
FC-04, FC-03Dependency-scoped invalidation of crew confirmation and package completeness onlyExactly those two objects invalidated; documents and tools untouchedHELDPASS
ADV-03
Package READY_FOR_AUTHORITY
New document revision published
FC-02, FC-03Package returns to incomplete pending materiality assessment; no auto-electionCorrect; materiality assessment is humanHELDPASS
ADV-04
F-SADR-10
Tool declared ready, shift active
Inspection validity expires during shift
FC-07Readiness recomputed on validity boundary; work stops or reassessesExpiry evaluated only at declaration; readiness persists until next explicit eventVIOLATEDFAIL
ADV-05
Signature request against version v3
Object advances to v4 before submission
FC-08Signature refused with version-mismatch reason codeRefused as expectedHELDPASS
ADV-06
Two activities, all pairwise PASS
Third activity added
SIMOPS (parent)Cumulative rules evaluated independently; non-compensable STOPCUM-3/4/6 fire; location verdict STOP regardless of pairwise passHELDPASS
ADV-07
Authenticated session, authorization pending
IAM becomes unavailable
FC-08, Authority (parent)DecisionRight unverifiable → UNRESOLVED → authorization refused; unrelated capabilities continueFail-closed and dependency-scopedHELDPASS
ADV-08
F-SADR-02
Offline IPERC edit queued
Newer online version exists at sync
FC-05Conflict raised, human reconciliation, no last-write-winsConflict raised at document granularity; row-level granularity unspecifiedUNDETERMINEDFAIL
ADV-09
Package under preparation
Applicability configuration missing for a potentially mandatory PETAR
Applicability (parent), FC-03REQUIRES_HUMAN_CONFIRMATION, never NOT_APPLICABLECorrect; UNKNOWN ≠ NOT_REQUIRED enforcedHELDPASS
ADV-10
F-SADR-02
Retrieval in progress
Two plausible active revisions returned
FC-02No auto-election; named ambiguous state; human resolution with reason codeNo auto-election, but no named state — object remains RETRIEVED while non-consumableVIOLATEDFAIL
ADV-11
Crew confirmation in progress
Source reports competent, DecisionRight expired
FC-04, AuthorityCompetency ≠ authority; authorization refused, crew membership unaffectedCorrect separationHELDPASS
ADV-12
Data retrieved, authorization pending
Source becomes unavailable
FC-02, FC-03Retrieved facts marked with freshness; authorization allowed only within governed staleness windowFreshness carried; staleness window definedHELDPASS
ADV-13
Package COMPLETE
Package item invalidated
FC-03COMPLETE revoked, not overridden; reason code recordedCorrect — completeness is recomputed, never latchedHELDPASS
ADV-14
IPERC in preparation
AI proposes a control conflicting with a governed control
FC-05, AI firewallProposal is non-consumable by the rule engine; human disposition requiredSEMANTIC_PROPOSAL blocked from IRDE consumptionHELDPASS
ADV-15
Signature request open
User re-activates request repeatedly
FC-08Idempotent — one authority act, one signatureCorrelation identity dedupesHELDPASS
ADV-16
F-SADR-13
Location acquisition
High GPS confidence, ambiguous canonical mapping
FC-01Confidence never resolves ambiguity; governed human fallback, discoverable in the fieldFallback exists but is three levels deep — usable only by a trained userHELDCONTROLLED
ADV-17
F-SADR-02
IPERC prepopulated
Field user modifies a source-derived hazard
FC-05Source value preserved and reconstructable; modification evented with actor and reasonCorrect, except revert-to-source emits no reason codeHELDCONTROLLED
ADV-18
Critical control verified in source
Local observation contradicts source
FC-05, Critical control (parent)Conflict is a first-class state; no automatic precedence; fail-closed pending human resolutionCorrectHELDPASS
ADV-19
Authorization pending
Supervisor role changes mid-shift
AuthorityCached permission invalid; DecisionRight re-resolvedRe-resolved; stale cache rejectedHELDPASS
ADV-20
F-SADR-10
Identical facts, rules, configuration, decision rights
Re-evaluation at a later clock time
FC-07, DeterminismSame material decisionDifferent decision possible via tool inspection expiry evaluated against wall clock without a fact changeVIOLATEDFAIL

AN. Unknown-unknown / systemic failure analysis

How the system could be locally correct and globally unsafe

SYS-01HIGHF-SADR-14

Temporal decoherence of a correct package: every fact is individually correct at the moment it was captured, and the package is authorized against a composition of facts that were never simultaneously true.

Propagation path
Document freshness window, competency validity, tool inspection validity, critical-control verification interval and SIMOPS work-set membership each have independent validity clocks. Package completeness is computed as a conjunction over facts, not over a common validity interval. A package can therefore be COMPLETE at T while no instant exists at which all constituent facts were simultaneously valid.
Detection mechanism
None currently. Freshness is displayed per item; no composite validity interval is computed or asserted.
Current control
Per-item staleness windows and invalidation on explicit change events — effective against changes, ineffective against elapsed validity.
Residual exposure
HIGH — this is the most credible route to a materially incorrect authorization while every component is locally correct.
SYS-02MEDIUMF-SADR-07

Governance-gap absorption: capabilities without a distinguishable owner (tool inspection validity, trusted timestamp) will acquire de facto owners at implementation, embedding organizational assumptions into code.

Propagation path
CAPABILITY_GOVERNANCE_GAP → implementation default → unwritten operational rule → audit finding at pilot.
Detection mechanism
Capability ownership test (section D) — currently the only detection point.
Current control
External dependency register (14 owner decisions).
Residual exposure
MEDIUM — controlled provided the register is closed by owner decision, not by assumption.

AO. Findings register

1 critical · 5 high (1 uncontrolled) · 6 medium · 2 low

F-SADR-01CRITICALUNCONTROLLEDFUNCTIONAL BASELINE CHANGE REQUIRED
Impact domain
FUNCTIONAL_CONTRACT / STATE_MODEL / AUTHORITY
Affected baseline
PH6A-FPSO-FUNCTIONAL-BASELINE-REV0
Affected contract
FC-FPSO-08 DigitalSignatureAssurance
Affected clause
Signature lifecycle — postconditions and timestamp dependency

Current conditionSIGNED is a terminal state. The contract names no successor for a signed object that is subsequently invalidated (document revision, crew change, delta, SIMOPS change), and defines no behaviour when the timestamp authority is unavailable.

Structural exposureAn authorization can be evidenced by a signature that is structurally valid while the decision it attests to has been invalidated. The record set contains no state expressing 'signed but no longer authorizing', so downstream readers — including audit — will read SIGNED as current authority.

Downstream consequenceWork may proceed in the field under an authorization that the readiness layer internally considers void, and the evidence chain will not show the divergence. Two implementation teams will additionally diverge on the offline/degraded timestamp path, one refusing signature and one accepting a device timestamp.

Failure scenarioADV-03 followed by ADV-05: a revision is published after signing; the package is invalidated; the signature record remains terminal SIGNED and is presented as the authorization of record.

Required architectural decisionName the post-signature invalidation state and its entry condition, and decide the timestamp-unavailable disposition (refuse vs. degraded-timestamp with explicit evidence marking).

Competent authorityAuthority function owner + signature/PKI owner (external dependency, unclosed)

Required correctionTargeted amendment to FC-FPSO-08: add successor state SIGNED_SUPERSEDED with entry condition, reason code and event; add explicit timestamp-authority failure behaviour; restate VALID_SIGNATURE ≠ VALID_DECISION as an enforced predicate, not a principle.

Evidence of closureAmended contract clause under a controlled change to the functional baseline, plus regression of ADV-01, ADV-03, ADV-05, ADV-13 and the illegal-state set.

Regression requiredADV-01, ADV-03, ADV-05, ADV-13, illegal-state H-04

Residual riskUntil closed, no implementation of FC-FPSO-08 is safe to start.

F-SADR-02HIGHUNCONTROLLEDFUNCTIONAL BASELINE CHANGE REQUIRED
Impact domain
FUNCTIONAL_CONTRACT / CONCURRENCY / TESTABILITY
Affected baseline
PH6A-FPSO-FCD-REV0 / FUNCTIONAL-BASELINE-REV0
Affected contract
FC-FPSO-02, FC-FPSO-05
Affected clause
Retrieval election, delta materiality, row-level concurrency

Current conditionThree material ambiguities: (a) ambiguous active revisions produce no named state; (b) IPERC delta materiality has no recorded classification predicate; (c) concurrent IPERC edits declare conflict without stating base-version granularity.

Structural exposureImplementationMaterialAmbiguity = 3 against a required value of 0. The prior declaration of 0 was schema completeness, not semantic sufficiency.

Downstream consequenceTwo competent teams produce materially different behaviour: one blocks a package on any concurrent edit, another merges per row; one treats an ambiguous revision as unusable, another as usable-with-warning. Delta materiality becomes untestable.

Failure scenarioADV-08, ADV-10, ADV-17.

Required architectural decisionName the ambiguous-revision state; define a materiality classification predicate with recorded inputs; fix concurrency granularity at row level with document-level base-version guard.

Competent authorityDocument control owner + ES&H authority + readiness layer architect

Required correctionContract-level clarification of FC-02 and FC-05 under a controlled change.

Evidence of closureRevised clauses plus re-execution of ADV-08, ADV-10, ADV-17 and the testability audit.

Regression requiredADV-08, ADV-10, ADV-17, AL testability set

Residual riskHIGH while open — divergent field behaviour on the two most-used contracts.

F-SADR-03HIGHCONTROLLEDDOWNSTREAM DESIGN CORRECTION
Impact domain
INTERACTION
Affected baseline
PH6A-FPSO-IAD-REV1
Affected contract
Interaction layer (no contract)
Affected clause
UX→contract traceability, declared OrphanUIActions = 0

Current conditionTwo affordances have no governing transition, authority or event: register bulk acknowledge, and re-open of a closed pre-start record.

Structural exposureBoth are state-affecting in user perception. Re-open in particular would resurrect a closed authority context outside any transition.

Downstream consequenceImplementation would invent transitions to satisfy the UI — the classic route to a UI-only state.

Failure scenarioUser re-opens a closed pre-start record after shift end; no reason code, no authority check, no event.

Required architectural decisionRemove both affordances or bind each to an existing governed transition.

Competent authorityInteraction design owner (downstream, no baseline change)

Required correctionIAD Rev.2 correction: delete bulk acknowledge; replace re-open with a governed supersession action.

Evidence of closureRecalculated UX→contract matrix with OrphanUIActions = 0 verified independently.

Regression requiredAF, AG assessments

Residual riskLOW once corrected downstream; no contract change needed.

F-SADR-04HIGHCONTROLLEDDOWNSTREAM DESIGN CORRECTION
Impact domain
EXTERNAL_DEPENDENCY / SECURITY
Affected baseline
PH6A-FPSO-FCA-REV0
Affected contract
FC-FPSO-08 / Authority
Affected clause
External dependency register

Current conditionDenominator declared as 12 owner decisions; reconstruction yields 14. Unenumerated: trusted-timestamp authority ownership, IAM session-revocation propagation latency.

Structural exposureUnenumerated dependencies are closed by assumption at implementation time.

Downstream consequenceA revoked session could remain materially authorizing for an unbounded window.

Failure scenarioADV-19 with a revocation that propagates after the authorization.

Required architectural decisionExtend the register to 14 and obtain owner decisions.

Competent authorityIAM owner; signature/timestamp owner

Required correctionRegister amendment (downstream) — no contract semantics change.

Evidence of closureOwner-signed decisions for both dependencies.

Regression requiredAD, ADV-07, ADV-19

Residual riskMEDIUM, controlled by the register.

F-SADR-05MEDIUMCONTROLLEDDOWNSTREAM DESIGN CORRECTION
Impact domain
ARCHITECTURE
Affected baseline
PH6A-FPSO-FCD-REV0
Affected contract
FC-FPSO-03 / FC-FPSO-05
Affected clause
Control adequacy vs package completeness

Current conditionBoth objects express 'control still required' with no stated precedence.

Structural exposureSemanticOverlap allowing contradictory readiness statements on one screen.

Downstream consequenceField user receives two answers to one question.

Failure scenarioIPERC adequate, package incomplete for the same control.

Required architectural decisionDeclare IPERC control adequacy as the authoritative control statement and package completeness as its aggregate consumer.

Competent authorityReadiness layer architect

Required correctionPrecedence clause in the downstream design.

Evidence of closurePrecedence rule documented and reflected in the interaction layer.

Regression requiredN, O assessments

Residual riskLOW.

F-SADR-06MEDIUMCONTROLLEDDOWNSTREAM DESIGN CORRECTION
Impact domain
STATE_MODEL
Affected baseline
PH6A-FPSO-FCD-REV0
Affected contract
FC-FPSO-05 / FC-FPSO-06
Affected clause
Delta ↔ IPERC reassessment cycle

Current conditionCycle exists with no termination rule.

Structural exposureUncontrolled cycle; theoretically unbounded reassessment.

Downstream consequenceField loop with no escalation point.

Failure scenarioEach reassessment raises a further delta.

Required architectural decisionAdd a delta generation counter with an escalation threshold to Hold Point.

Competent authorityES&H authority

Required correctionDownstream design rule; no contract semantics change.

Evidence of closureTermination rule documented; cycle regression executed.

Regression requiredG, S assessments

Residual riskLOW.

F-SADR-07MEDIUMCONTROLLEDDOWNSTREAM DESIGN CORRECTION
Impact domain
ARCHITECTURE / EXTERNAL_DEPENDENCY
Affected baseline
PH6A-FPSO-FCD-REV0
Affected contract
FC-FPSO-07 ToolReadiness
Affected clause
Ownership of tool inspection validity

Current conditionNo distinguishable owner for business meaning, source data, rule or configuration.

Structural exposureCAPABILITY_GOVERNANCE_GAP.

Downstream consequenceImplementation default becomes de facto governance (SYS-02).

Failure scenarioTool inspection source chosen by developers.

Required architectural decisionAssign owners — not to be invented by this review.

Competent authorityProject/asset governance (external, unclosed)

Required correctionRegister as owner decision; no contract change.

Evidence of closureOwner assignment evidence.

Regression requiredD, Q assessments

Residual riskMEDIUM.

F-SADR-08MEDIUMCONTROLLEDDOWNSTREAM DESIGN CORRECTION
Impact domain
INTERACTION / ARCHITECTURE
Affected baseline
PH6A-FPSO-IAD-REV1
Affected contract
SIMOPS presentation
Affected clause
Aggregate verdict presentation

Current conditionPairwise and aggregate verdicts collapse into a single chip; the collapse rule lives only in the interaction layer.

Structural exposurePresentationLayerBusinessLogic; aggregate conflict can be visually indistinguishable from a pairwise one.

Downstream consequenceA non-compensable cumulative STOP could read as an ordinary conflict.

Failure scenarioADV-06 displayed as a single conflict chip.

Required architectural decisionPresent pairwise and aggregate verdicts as separate, non-collapsible statements.

Competent authorityInteraction design owner

Required correctionDownstream interaction correction.

Evidence of closureRevised presentation spec; AF regression.

Regression requiredR, AF

Residual riskLOW.

F-SADR-09MEDIUMCONTROLLEDDOWNSTREAM DESIGN CORRECTION
Impact domain
BECHTELIZATION
Affected baseline
PH6A-BXIA-REV0 / PH6A-FPSO-IAD-REV1
Affected contract
Vocabulary
Affected clause
F-IAD-03 reassessment

Current conditionThree terms are used for the same document object across corporate and field layers.

Structural exposureTerminology divergence at the enterprise boundary.

Downstream consequenceRegister/search behaviour inconsistent with corporate expectation.

Failure scenarioUser searches a corporate term and finds nothing in the field layer.

Required architectural decisionSingle canonical document vocabulary before G-FPSO-04B.

Competent authorityDocument control owner

Required correctionVocabulary reconciliation — reclassified from NON_BLOCKING to BLOCKING for G-FPSO-04B only.

Evidence of closureReconciled vocabulary table.

Regression requiredAH

Residual riskLOW; does not block Macro-Prompt A by itself.

F-SADR-10HIGHCONTROLLEDDOWNSTREAM DESIGN CORRECTION
Impact domain
STATE_MODEL / DETERMINISM
Affected baseline
PH6A-FPSO-FCD-REV0
Affected contract
FC-FPSO-07 ToolReadiness
Affected clause
Inspection validity evaluation point

Current conditionValidity is evaluated at declaration only; elapsed time does not trigger re-evaluation.

Structural exposureReachableIllegalMaterialState (ToolReadyWithExpiredRequiredInspection) and a determinism violation.

Downstream consequenceReadiness persists past validity within a shift.

Failure scenarioADV-04, ADV-20.

Required architectural decisionTreat validity boundaries as governed temporal events that re-evaluate dependent readiness.

Competent authorityReadiness layer architect

Required correctionDownstream design rule: validity-boundary re-evaluation, dependency-scoped.

Evidence of closureRe-execution of ADV-04, ADV-20 and illegal-state H-06 with reachable = false.

Regression requiredADV-04, ADV-20, H, Q, Z

Residual riskControlled by an explicit correction commitment; blocks nothing at contract level.

F-SADR-11MEDIUMCONTROLLEDDOWNSTREAM DESIGN CORRECTION
Impact domain
AUTHORITY / SECURITY
Affected baseline
PH6A-FPSO-FCD-REV0
Affected contract
FC-FPSO-05
Affected clause
Review of field-observed rows

Current conditionOne person may author, confirm and review the same control-adequacy row.

Structural exposureSOD_REQUIRED_BUT_UNDEFINED for control adequacy.

Downstream consequenceSelf-review of a life-critical control statement.

Failure scenarioLone supervisor at shift start.

Required architectural decisionDefine where independent review is materially required and what the governed exception is.

Competent authorityES&H authority

Required correctionDownstream SoD rule with a governed exception path.

Evidence of closureSoD rule documented; J regression.

Regression requiredJ, O

Residual riskMEDIUM.

F-SADR-12LOWCONTROLLEDDOWNSTREAM DESIGN CORRECTION
Impact domain
PROVENANCE
Affected baseline
PH6A-FPSO-FCD-REV0
Affected contract
FC-FPSO-02 → Applicability
Affected clause
Retrieval snapshot binding

Current conditionApplicability decisions do not pin the retrieval snapshot id.

Structural exposureProvenance is inferable but not pinned.

Downstream consequenceReconstruction of a historical applicability decision requires inference.

Failure scenarioAudit of an applicability decision after several revisions.

Required architectural decisionBind snapshot id into the applicability fact.

Competent authorityReadiness layer architect

Required correctionDownstream data-binding correction.

Evidence of closureProvenance chain test with pinned snapshot.

Regression requiredAB

Residual riskLOW.

F-SADR-13LOWCONTROLLEDDOWNSTREAM DESIGN CORRECTION
Impact domain
INTERACTION
Affected baseline
PH6A-FPSO-IAD-REV1
Affected contract
FC-FPSO-01
Affected clause
Governed fallback discoverability

Current conditionFallback for ambiguous canonical mapping is three levels deep.

Structural exposureOperationallyUnusableButTechnicallyReachable.

Downstream consequenceField users bypass by choosing a plausible Location.

Failure scenarioADV-16.

Required architectural decisionSurface the fallback at the point of ambiguity.

Competent authorityInteraction design owner

Required correctionDownstream interaction correction.

Evidence of closureRevised screen spec; AG regression.

Regression requiredAG, ADV-16

Residual riskLOW.

F-SADR-14HIGHCONTROLLEDDOWNSTREAM DESIGN CORRECTION
Impact domain
ARCHITECTURE / DATA
Affected baseline
PH6A-IADA-REV1 (consumer-side) / FC-FPSO-03
Affected contract
PreStartPreventivePackage
Affected clause
Composite validity of package facts

Current conditionCompleteness is a conjunction over individually fresh facts; no composite validity interval is computed.

Structural exposureTemporal decoherence (SYS-01) — a package can be authorized against facts that were never simultaneously valid.

Downstream consequenceMaterially incorrect authorization while every component is locally correct.

Failure scenarioCompetency valid to 08:00, tool inspection valid from 08:30, document freshness window expiring 08:15; authorization at 08:40 sees three individually acceptable facts.

Required architectural decisionIntroduce a composite validity interval as a first-class readiness attribute, evaluated at authorization time.

Competent authorityReadiness layer architect + ES&H authority

Required correctionDownstream design correction on the consumer side of the sealed parent; the parent's semantics are not changed, only a derived attribute is added.

Evidence of closureComposite-interval predicate specified and regression of N, S, Z and SYS-01.

Regression requiredN, S, Z, SYS-01

Residual riskHIGH until specified; controlled by explicit correction commitment and by PilotExposure = PROHIBITED.

AP. Prior finding reconciliation

No finding silently reopened, closed or lost

Prior finding setDeclaredIndependent verificationVerdict
F-FCA-01…F-FCA-10 (contract assurance corrections)CLOSED by controlled correction10/10 remain closed; corrections are traceable to clause textCONFIRMED
F-FCA-11 (LOW, controlled-open)CONTROLLED_OPENRemains controlled-open; no silent closureCONFIRMED
F-IAD-01, F-IAD-02 (corrected in design)CLOSEDClosed with design evidenceCONFIRMED
F-IAD-03 (vocabulary gap)NON_BLOCKINGReassessed as BLOCKING for G-FPSO-04B onlyRECLASSIFIED
F-IAD-04 (LOW controlled non-blocking)CONTROLLED_OPENUnchangedCONFIRMED
ADR-03, ADR-13/CA-01, ADR-15…24, CA-03, CA-04CONTROLLED_OPENAll remain controlled-open; none silently closedCONFIRMED
silentlyReopened
0
silentlyClosed
0
lostFindings
0
findingWithNoClosureEvidence
0

AQ. Required corrections & change classification

Downstream design correction
F-SADR-03F-SADR-04F-SADR-05F-SADR-06F-SADR-07F-SADR-08F-SADR-09F-SADR-10F-SADR-11F-SADR-12F-SADR-13F-SADR-14
Functional baseline change required
F-SADR-01F-SADR-02
Architecture reopen required
None — PH6A-IADA-REV1 remains sealed and unmodified

AR. Residual risk register

IDRiskSeverityControlExposure
RR-01Signature record outlives the decision it attests toCRITICALFC-FPSO-08 amendment (F-SADR-01) — not yet madeOPEN
RR-02Divergent implementations of retrieval election, delta materiality and IPERC concurrencyHIGHFC-02/FC-05 clarification (F-SADR-02) — not yet madeOPEN
RR-03Temporal decoherence of package factsHIGHComposite validity interval (F-SADR-14) + PilotExposure PROHIBITEDCONTROLLED
RR-04Governance gaps absorbed by implementation defaultsMEDIUMExternal dependency register extended to 14 owner decisionsCONTROLLED
RR-05UI-only affordances becoming UI-only statesMEDIUMIAD downstream correction (F-SADR-03)CONTROLLED

AS. Authorization decision for Macro-Prompt A

Hard-stop criteria evaluated independently

Hard-stop criterionValueStatus
CriticalFinding > 01BREACHED
HighUncontrolledFinding > 01BREACHED
ArchitectureReopenRequiredFALSECLEAR
FunctionalBaselineChangeRequiredTRUEBREACHED
OpenMaterialSemanticAmbiguity > 03BREACHED
ReachableIllegalMaterialState > 01BREACHED
AuthorityLeakage > 00CLEAR
SourceAuthorityPromotion > 00CLEAR
ContractToUITraceabilityBreak > 02BREACHED
UncontrolledConcurrencyPath > 01BREACHED
UncontrolledIdempotencyFailure > 00CLEAR
INTEGRATED_SOFTWARE_ASSURANCE_REVIEW
HOLD
ReviewID
PH6A-II-SADR-REV0
CriticalFindings
1
HighFindings
4
HighUncontrolledFindings
1
MediumFindings
6
LowFindings
3
OpenMaterialSemanticAmbiguity
3
ReachableIllegalMaterialStates
1
AuthorityLeakage
0
SourceAuthorityPromotions
0
ArchitectureDrift
0
FunctionalBaselineChangeRequired
TRUE
ArchitectureReopenRequired
FALSE
TraceabilityBreaks
2
ConcurrencyUncontrolledPaths
1
IdempotencyUncontrolledPaths
0
ADVRegression
16/20
BechtelizationReadiness
NOT_READY
MacroPromptA_Authorized
FALSE
Blocking finding IDs
F-SADR-01F-SADR-02F-SADR-03F-SADR-10
Affected baselines
  • · PH6A-FPSO-FUNCTIONAL-BASELINE-REV0
  • · PH6A-FPSO-FCD-REV0
  • · PH6A-FPSO-FCA-REV0
  • · PH6A-FPSO-IAD-REV1
Required correction layer
  • · FUNCTIONAL_CONTRACT (FC-FPSO-08, FC-FPSO-02, FC-FPSO-05) — controlled change to the frozen functional baseline
  • · DOWNSTREAM_DESIGN (IAD interaction corrections, validity-boundary re-evaluation, composite validity interval, SoD rule, dependency register)
Required regression
  • · ADV-01, ADV-03, ADV-04, ADV-05, ADV-08, ADV-10, ADV-13, ADV-16, ADV-17, ADV-20
  • · Illegal-state reachability set (10)
  • · UX→contract and contract→UX recalculation
  • · Testability and determinism audits
Not authorized
Bechtelization (G-FPSO-04B)Prototype implementationDemonstrationMacro-Prompt A